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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

THE "HoT TRAIL" INTO MEXICO AND EXTRADITION AN4 .oMs.-The
recent decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Dominguez v.
State, 234 S. W. 79, has given us an important precedent and also a valuable
example of the solution of novel problems by means of analogies. A detachment of the military forces of the United States had been authorized by the
War Department to enter Mexico on the "hot trail" in pursuit of bandits.
While following a "hot trail" this detachment arrested Dominguez, a native
citizen and resident of Mexico, and returned with him to the United States.
It developed later that he was not one of the bandits who made the "hot
trail." Dominguez was thereupon turned over, without his consent, to the
afithorities of Texas, and was indicted and convicted for a murder previously
committed in Texas. It was held upon appeal that the prisoner might resist
trial for the offense charged in the indictment until such time as he should
voluntarily subject himself to the jurisdiction of the United States or until
the consent of the Mexican government to his trial should be obtained.
There was no precedent in the decided cases. Counsel argued for the
application by analogy of the principles which control in the decision of
extradition cases. In reliance upon the extradition analogies the case was
decided.
In general, apart from treaty, independent states are said to be under
no international obligation to surrender fugitives from justice. Hyng, INT.
LAW, I, § 3II; MooRm, DIGE ST, IV, 245; Moong, EXTRADITION, I, 2I ff. The
facility with which criminals may find asylum il other countries has led
most states to conclude treaties in which provision is made for the extradition of fugitives charged with any one or more of an enumerated list of
crimes. See the Extradition Treaty with Mexico of 1899, art. 2, and the
Supplementary Extradition Convention of 19o3, MAILOY, TRrATInS, I, 1184,
1193. See also HYD4, I, §§ 313 if. The extradition of fugitives is thus a
concession and compromise defined in treaties, a mitigation of strict right
in the common interest of all civilized states. Comity and good faith among
nations require that the concession should not be overtaxed or abused. It
follows, according to the rule generally approved, and expressly affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the United States, that "a person who has been
brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under
an extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offenses described in
that treaty, and for the offense with which he is charged in the proceedings
for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given
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him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country
from whose asylum he has been forcibly taken under those proceedings."
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 430. See Hvn, I, § 322; Mooru,
EXTRADITION, I, 219 ff. See also rohnson v. Browne, 205 U. S. 309. Compare
Collins v. O'Neil, 214 U. S. 113.
While the rule of the Rauscher case has frequently been so stated as to
emphasize the extradited prisoner's right to resist trial upon any other
charge than the one upon which he was extradited, it is submitted that the
prisoner's right is only incidental and a convenient safeguard against the
possibility that the confidence of the state of asylum may be abused. See
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 419-22; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S.
436, 443; MooRI, EXTRADITION, IL io42. This analysis finds strong support
in the circumstance that the rule of the Rauscher case does not apply
between the several states of the United States where considerations of
international comity and good faith are not involved. Lascelles v. Georgia,
148 -U. S. 537; Mooaz, EXTRADITION, II, l035 ff. See 20 MIcH. L. Rv.
449. It is further supported by the circumstance that the rule does not
apply where the prisoner has been abducted or kidnapped from the state of
asylum. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, decided at the same time as the
Rauscher case. HvDn, I, § 321; MooaZ, EXTRADITION, I, 294 ff. The abduction or kidnapping, as in the Ker case, is a violation of jurisdiction of
which the asylum state may justly complain; but it seems clear that the
recognition of a right in the prisoner to resist trial, so far from operating
to prevent a breach of faith between nations or to afford the affronted state
adequate satisfaction, would only add insult to injury.
If the prisoner is regularly extradited, therefore, as in the Rauscher
case, he may be tried only for the offense for which he is extradited; but
if he is kidnapped, as in the Ker case, considerations of international comity
and good faith afford him no protection. Of these two rules, entirely consistent if the reasons therefor are understood, which is the better suited to
the novel situation presented in Dominguez v. State? Viewing the situation
superficially, an analogy with the Ker case would have been more plausible.
Inasmuch, however, as the pursuit and arrest of bandits in Mexico without
the consent of the Mexican government would have been a gross violation
of Mexican jurisdiction, the Court indulged the presumption-with entire
propriety, it is submitted-that instructions from the War Department to
follow the "hot trail" were issued pursuant to some kind of agreement with
Mexico. This presumption brought the case within the reason and hence
within the rule of United States v. Rauscher. Considerations of international comity and good faith are quite as important in case of the pursuit
and capture of bandits pursuant to agreement as in case of extradition
under treaty. Had one of the bandits pursued been captured, he should not
have been tried for any other offense than that which started the "hot trail."
No greater right was acquired as regards Dominguez, who was wrongly
arrested on the mistaken assumption that he was one of the bandits pursued.
E. D. D.
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